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Abstract 
The executive suite and the board are closely bound to each other through their fiduciary responsibility to 
same shareholders. With CEOs’ prominent role in both governing bodies, their independence from CEOs’ 
self-serving behavior might be related to each other. We explore the interdependence using an external 
shock increasing board independence. The shock weakens executive suite independence by increasing 
CEO connectedness within executive suites through appointments and pre-existing social ties. We also 
uncover interesting dynamics between the two governing bodies: (1) the spillover does not occur when 
treated firms increase CEO-independent director social ties, suggesting CEO-executive connections and 
CEO-director connections are substitutes; (2) consistent with theories of board independence, when 
information environment calls for dependent boards, increasing CEO-executive connections, which helps 
negate the shock effect on the board, has positive marginal effects on firm performance. Our findings are 
not driven by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and are robust to a battery of other tests. We conclude that 
independence in the board and executive suite are inversely related; inferring the overall independence 
from board independence alone can be highly misleading.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporations have two main governing bodies: the board of directors and the executive suite of 
the CEO and her top lieutenants. Numerous papers are devoted to studying whether and how board 
independence helps protect shareholder interest from CEOs’ self-serving behavior.1 Studies on executive 
suite independence include Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009), who argue that the presence of more top 
executives with different preferences and dissenting views—independent executives—strengthens 
governance and steers CEOs toward more shareholder-friendly decisions. Acharya, Myers, and Rajan 
(2011) show how self-serving actions of CEOs are limited by potential reactions of other top executives. 
These two studies suggest executive suite independence also matters.  
There is a gap in this governance literature. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study 
examines the interrelation between board independence and executive suite independence. The board’s 
primary function is to monitor and advise the executive team, the chief of which is the CEO, who also 
serves on the board, often as the chair. With such interactions between the two governing bodies with 
fiduciary responsibilities to the same shareholders, independence in one governing body is likely to be 
related to the other. In this paper we explore whether and how board and executive suite independence are 
interrelated. It is an important issue, because if the relation is negative, inferring the overall governance 
independence from board independence alone can be highly misleading.  
Both board and executive suite independence are endogenous; thus to investigate a causal 
relation, we rely on an external shock on board independence, the independent board requirement for 
NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed firms, which forces dependent boards to become independent. How the 
shock will affect executive suite independence is not obvious. If the newly independent board has 
sufficient influence over top executive personnel decisions and believes independent top executives are 
good for shareholders, the executive suite will become more independent.  
                                                 
1 So many papers study board independence that a complete list of the papers is too long for the limited space here. 
However, the reader can find most of them in reference sections of papers we cite later in this study. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2468103 
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An opposing prediction emerges, however, when we extend Adams and Ferreira’s model (2007) 
to allow for a CEO affected by the shock to influence executive suite composition. In the model, CEOs 
resent monitoring but value board advising. CEOs may withhold information from an independent board 
to make monitoring less effective. But board advising is more valuable when the board is better informed. 
To derive full benefits from board advising, shareholders may decide to have a dependent board in order 
to increase CEOs’ optimal level of information sharing. A CEO who had a dependent board prior to the 
shock, therefore, will consider the newly independent board after the shock too independent and withhold 
more information than before (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The CEO also may take other actions to 
weaken monitoring, such as undertaking more CEO-specific investments and activities that provide 
greater informational advantage over the board (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995; 
Baldenius, Melumad, and Meng, 2014). 
Withholding information from the board or taking information asymmetry-increasing projects 
cannot be done by the CEO alone. Other top executives may possess the relevant information and leak it 
to the board. If the CEO wants to take information asymmetry-increasing projects, independent-minded 
top lieutenants may dissent in the implementation stage (Landier et al, 2009) and/or exert insufficient 
efforts (Acharya et al., 2011). To obtain the necessary cooperation from other top executives and have 
them dissent less, the CEO may make the executive suite more dependent by increasing her 
connectedness in the executive suite through appointment decisions and social ties. This may be possible 
because, in practice, CEOs have large degrees of freedom to decide the executive suite composition. 
Although the board heads the organization chart and possesses the authority to appoint or dismiss CEOs, 
it typically meets only a few times a year and independent directors work part-time. CEOs, by contrast, 
work full time and have employees at their disposal to perform the necessary footwork to make their 
cases to their boards. That is, CEOs may have effective control over top executive personnel decisions.  
To investigate which of the two predictions prevail in the data, we estimate differences-in-
differences in executive suite independence using the independent board requirement for NYSE- and 
NASDAQ-listed firms as an exogenous shock. The estimation relies on variation in the pre-regulation 
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board composition. The treatment (control) group is firms without (with) a majority of independent 
directors prior to the shock. Treatment and control groups show parallel trends in our measure of 
executive suite dependence prior to the shock. We construct a control group using propensity-scores (PS) 
to improve comparability and report estimates based on both unmatched and PS-matched samples. 
We measure executive suite dependence by the fraction of top-four non-CEO executives 
appointed (FT4A) during a CEO’s tenure and the CEO’s pre-existing social ties with the appointees. 
Higher FT4A helps increase what social psychologists refer to as “social influence,” which relies on 
norms of reciprocity, liking, and social consensus to shape management’s decision making (Cialdini, 
1984). CEOs are heavily involved in recruiting, nominating, and appointing their top lieutenants, so their 
appointees are more likely to share similar briefs and preferences with, and may be more beholden to, the 
CEO in comparison to those appointed by a previous CEO (Landier, Sauvagnat, Sraer, and Thesmar, 
2013).2 Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014) rely on a similar notion of 
reciprocity between directors and the CEO when they measure how “co-opted” a board is by the fraction 
of directors appointed during a CEO’s tenure.3 We also measure social ties between CEOs and their 
appointees because the familiarity acquired through prior social interactions helps a CEO select 
individuals who are more closely aligned and less likely to dissent (Fracassi and Tate, 2012).  
We find the shock significantly increases FT4A, suggesting a shakeup in executive suites amid 
the mandated board transition. Most treated firms achieve higher FT4A without costly severance 
packages or losing firm-specific knowledge. The vast majority of executives who lost positions on the 
top-four list remain with the firm following the regulation. The higher FT4A seems largely a result of 
appointing executives to positions of higher rank than previous CEOs’ appointees. Our results are not 
driven by longer tenure of previous CEOs’ appointees, inside director turnovers, or CEO turnovers. 
                                                 
2 A previous CEO’s appointee also may feel grateful if a CEO decides to retain her. However, new appointment 
through hiring and promotion requires greater engagement and commitment on the part of the CEO than retaining 
someone from the previous team; hence, the connectedness will be closer with one’s own appointees than with 
previous CEO’ appointees.  
3 Independent directors appointed during the shock might be co-opted, weakening the real effect of the shock on 
board independence. If so, the spillover to the executive suite also will be weaker, leading to smaller increases in 
FTA and CEO-executive social ties in favor of the null hypothesis of no shock effect. 
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A closer look at turnovers in the top-four list during the board transition reveals CEOs’ strong 
influence on who stays on the list and who remains as an inside director—their own appointees. While 
longer tenure works against previous CEOs’ appointees, it helps current CEOs’ appointees remain on the 
top-four list. Inside directors who are current CEOs’ appointees also emerge largely intact from the board 
restructuring. In addition, we find executives newly appointed to the top-four list at treated firms are more 
socially pre-connected to the CEO, as measured by network ties formed during overlapping years prior to 
their appointments through past employment, education, and membership in social organizations.   
Closer CEO connectedness with top executives may not be the only means treated firms counter 
the shock. If regulation forces a board to appoint more independent directors than endogenously 
determined, the firm may recruit independent directors with more “disutility for monitoring” (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998). Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint 
directors with whom they have social ties and that CEO-director social ties weaken the intensity of board 
monitoring. We find weak evidence of the shock increasing CEO-independent director social ties, 
indicating some CEOs influence director appointment decisions even when nominating committees 
consist entirely of independent directors. More important, when CEO-director ties increase, we find no 
changes in FT4A. Only when CEO-director ties do not increase do we observe significant increases in 
FT4A. CEO-director ties and FT4A appear substitutes. Perhaps CEOs increase FT4A only when they are 
unable to increase social dependency of the board.  
How does increasing CEO connectedness affect firm performance? The answer may depend on 
why a firm chose a dependent board prior to the shock. Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) present a 
model which shows that when outsiders’ cost to acquire information is high, an outsider controlled board 
is ineffective and an insider controlled board—dependent board in our dichotomy—is optimal for 
shareholders. Consistent with the prediction, they find that the shock hurts shareholder value for firms 
with high information costs.  
Our estimation takes a step further, estimating how increases in FT4A affect firm performance. 
We find higher FT4As have positive marginal effects on both operating performance and shareholder 
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value for firms in high information cost environments. That is, when the regulation can hurt firm value, 
increasing CEO connectedness in response to the regulation helps mitigate the negative impact.  
Our findings of higher FT4A are not driven by the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002 or by other confounding events. Placebo tests using “controlled” firms that are exempt from the 
independent board requirement but subject to the SOX requirements and other confounding events show 
no increase in FT4A. Reestimation of the baseline regression for firms exempt from Section 404 of the 
SOX shows significant increases in FT4A. Our results are also robust to a compensation-weighted FT4A 
allowing for differences in influence across rank among those on the top-four list, abnormal measures of 
FT4A (residuals of regression relating FT4A to CEO tenure and other factors mechanically correlated to 
FT4A). We also check robustness to an alternative measure of treatment effects, major structural changes 
in the firm, and an alternative sample construction. None alters our conclusion. 
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating dynamics between the executive suite and 
the board, an issue overlooked by previous researchers. We find independence in the board and executive 
suite is inversely related; thus, inferring the overall governance independence from board independence 
alone will be highly misleading. Also important, weakening executive suite independence is not 
necessarily bad; it could help or hurt firm performance depending on the information environment.  
This study also fills a void in the literature on CEO influence and involvement in the selection of 
top echelon players governing the firm. Previous studies examine CEO influence on selecting board 
members (e.g., Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Coles et 
al., 2014). We add to this literature by studying CEO influence on the appointment and composition of 
the other corporate governing body—the executive suite.  
The next section develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes empirical design and data. Section 4 
presents our main findings on CEO-executive connections. Section 5 investigates how the shock’s effect 
on CEO-executive connections interacts with CEO-independent director social ties. Section 6 presents 
firm performance analysis. Section 7 conducts robustness tests. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses Development  
In this section we analyze a theoretical linkage between board independence and executive suite 
independence by integrating existing theories on their compositions. To develop empirically testable 
hypotheses, we consider an exogenous shock forcing dependent boards to become independent. As such, 
we begin with the conceptual framework of Adams and Ferreira (2007), because it provides a theory of 
why some firms choose dependent boards. Then we expand the framework to examine how CEOs may 
change executive suite composition in response to the shock.  
Adams and Ferreira (AF) assume (1) shareholders hire CEOs and boards, and determine the level 
of board independence; (2) non-independent directors advise and independent directors monitor; (3) 
CEOs dislike monitoring because they value control, from which they derive private benefits, and like 
advising because advice increases firm value; (4) both advising and monitoring are more effective when 
the board is better informed; and (5) the board depends on the CEO for firm-specific information. In this 
framework, CEOs face a trade-off in sharing information with the board. Sharing more information 
improves the value of advising but also increases the risk of board interference in decision making. The 
tradeoff point is affected by the level of board independence; hence, to induce CEOs to share more 
information, shareholders may choose a dependent board.  
How would a CEO who had a dependent board react to a shock forcing the board to become 
independent? A direct implication of the AF model is that the CEO will withhold more information from 
the board than before in order to reduce the effectiveness of monitoring. The CEO may also take more 
CEO-specific investments the board cannot monitor effectively (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), activities for 
which information asymmetries are particularly large (Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995), and projects which give 
the CEO more informational advantage over the board (Baldenius et al., 2014). 
Withholding more information from the board or undertaking the information asymmetry-
increasing activities cannot be done by the CEO alone. Other executives may also have the relevant 
information and leak it to the board. If the CEO decides to take information asymmetry-increasing 
projects, independent-minded top lieutenants may dissent in the implementation stage (Landier et al., 
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2009) and/or exert insufficient efforts (Acharya et al., 2011). Preventing information leaks and 
implementing the projects requires cooperation from other members of the executive suite.  
Other top executives may cooperate more and dissent less if they are connected to the CEO 
through appointments and social ties. As discussed earlier, the more top executives appointed during a 
CEO’s tenure, the greater the CEO’s social influence in the executive suite and the more cooperative his 
top lieutenants. The social influence will become stronger if the appointees are also socially pre-
connected to the CEO. Such CEO connectedness may be viewed as a form of management entrenchment 
that helps control information flow to the board and implement information asymmetry-increasing 
activities. Consistent with this conjecture, Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2014) find that “when 
management is more likely to be entrenched, management forecasts become less precise, and to some 
extent less frequent.” (p. 385). Based on the above theoretical considerations, we make: 
Prediction 1: When regulation forces a dependent board to become independent, the executive suite will 
become more dependent as measured by the CEO’s connectedness within the executive suite. 
How do changes in executive suites in response to the shock affect firm performance? Consider 
the pros and cons of CEO connectedness from the shareholder perspective. The main benefit is better 
cooperation and coordination among top executives, enabling them to act and react more efficiently to 
internal and external challenges (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Li, Lu, and Phillips, 2015; Han, 
Nanda, and Silveri, 2016). The costs are compromising the best combination in forming the top executive 
team and the risk of inadequate checks and balances. 4 An optimal level of CEO connectedness involves 
trading off these benefits and costs.5   
This optimal level of CEO connectedness is likely to be perturbed by the shock, which moves the 
level of board independence away from the optimal level. When an endogenously determined dependent 
board is forced to become independent, the CEO will withhold more information from the board (Adams 
                                                 
4 The risk of inadequate checks and balances due to close CEO connectedness with top executives is illuminated in 
Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015), which shows that appointment-based CEO connectedness increases the likelihood of 
committing fraud, decreases the likelihood of detection, makes CEO dismissal less likely upon detection, and lowers 
the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activities.  
5 Adams et al. (2005) find powerful CEOs are associated with the best and worst firm performance. 
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and Ferreira, 2007), which will also make board advice less useful. To make up for the loss in the 
usefulness of board advice, the CEO may turn to the executive suite for more efficient internal sharing of 
information that can generate more valuable ideas and advice from executives. Harris and Raviv (2008) 
present an equilibrium model in which a dependent board is optimal when insiders’ information is crucial 
for firm profitability, suggesting startups in high-tech industries as an example. For these firms, protecting 
insider information is crucial. When the board is forced to have more outsiders than endogenously 
determined, increasing CEO connectedness in executive suites may help insulate the decision-making 
process from outsiders and allow insiders to more freely exploit their collective inside information for 
profitability. Increasing CEO connectedness is then a step toward the new optimal level of executive suite 
independence, which helps mitigate the negative effect of the shock on firm value.  
Duchin et al. (2010) present a model combining key features of Adams and Ferreira (2007) and 
Harris and Raviv (2008). The model predicts, with supporting evidence, that when outsiders’ cost of 
acquiring information is high, an independent board is ineffective and a dependent board is optimal; 
hence, the shock decreases shareholder value. This helps us to make a conditional prediction based on the 
information environment: When the information cost is high, increasing CEO connectedness moves 
executive suite independence toward the new optimal level and thus will have a positive marginal effect. 
When outsiders’ cost of acquiring information is low, Duchin et al. (2010) argue that an 
independent board is optimal but entrenched CEOs may choose dependent boards for private benefits, and 
thus the shock will improve shareholder value. However, from the entrenched CEO’s perspective, the 
newly independent board poses a threat to private benefits, so he may increase connectedness with top 
executives to present a more united front against monitoring. Such responses are likely to reduce the 
positive effect the shock could have had on firm performance. Thus, we make: 
Prediction 2: When outsiders’ cost of acquiring information is high (low), increases in CEO 
connectedness in response to the shock will have positive (negative) marginal effects on firm performance.   
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We test these predictions by first investigating whether the shock increases CEO connectedness 
in executive suites. Then we relate the shock-induced changes in CEO connectedness to operating 
performance and shareholder value under high- and low-information cost environments. 
3. Empirical Design and Data 
3.1. Proxies for CEO connectedness  
Our primary proxy for CEO connectedness in executive suites is the connections a CEO has built 
through appointments of top-four non-CEO executives. It is measured by FT4Ait, the fraction of top-four 
non-CEO executives appointed—hired or promoted from within the firm—during the tenure of firm i’s 
CEO as of year t. It ranges from zero to one in increments of 0.25. Top-four non-CEO executives are 
identified from ExecuComp, which ranks executives by the sum of salaries and bonuses. We assume the 
year an executive first appears on the top-four list is the year she obtained the position. We compare this 
year with the year a current CEO took office to determine whether the executive is appointed during the 
CEO’s tenure. To prevent changes in the reported number of executives from affecting within-firm 
variation in FT4A, we drop observations when ExecuComp reports fewer than four non-CEO executives.6  
We also use CEOs’ pre-exiting network ties with their appointees as another measure of CEO 
connectedness. We count the total number of network ties CEOs and their appointees have, Exe_Tie, 
through past employment, educational institutions, and past membership to social and professional 
organizations. To avoid reverse causality, we include only network ties formed prior to joining the 
company. We also require that network ties are established during overlapping years for each category of 
network ties; in the education category, for example, the years a CEO and an executive attended the same 
school must overlap. We capture the depth of past connections by counting the number of network ties for 
each category. Then we sum the three types of ties to arrive at the total number of ties.  
3.2.  Difference-in-differences Estimation 
                                                 
6Kim and Lu (2011) illustrate the importance of keeping the number of executives constant when constructing 
executive variables for panel regressions with firm fixed effects. Cross-checking against proxy statements shows 
that missing executives in ExecuComp are due to omission rather than to dismissal; hence, the restriction is unlikely 
to introduce a selection bias.  
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Because both board and executive suite compositions are endogenous, we use an exogenous 
shock on board independence. The shock is the requirement for a majority of independent directors for 
firms listed on NYSE and NASDAQ. The deadline for compliance was October 31, 2004; however, many 
firms that lacked a majority of independent directors began to change their board composition in 2002 
when the recommendations were promulgated by NYSE and NASDAQ. The largest changes occurred in 
2002 and 2003 (see Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009, Table 1, Panel A; and Duchin et al., 2010, Figure 
1.) Thus, we use 2001 as the base-year to define which firms are affected by the regulation and 2003 as 
the first year of the post-regulation period. We treat 2002 as the transition period and exclude 
observations during that year in estimating difference-in-differences.7 The baseline specification is 
    Yit = ai + at + β1Affectedi*Postt + β2Xit + εit .                                  (1) 
Yit is a measure of firm i’s current CEO’s connectedness as of year t, as measured by either FT4A or pre-
existing social ties. Affectedi is the treatment indicator, equal to one if firm i does not have a majority of 
independent directors in 2001, and zero otherwise. This indicator is interacted with Postt, the post-
regulation indicator, equal to one if year t is 2003 or later. The regression includes firm- and year fixed 
effects, so it does not contain stand-alone variables Affectedi and Post. X is time-varying control variables. 
When estimation is based on an unmatched sample, standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The 
Appendix contains definitions of all variables.  
In a difference-in-differences estimation, the outcome variable of the control group is used to 
calculate the expected counterfactual, assuming that the treatment and control groups have the same time 
trend if there are no regulatory changes. Thus, we check whether FT4As of treated and control firms were 
following similar trends before the treatment. Figure 1 plots FT4As separately for our sample of treated 
and control firms from 1996 to 2006. Both groups show increasing FT4As, with remarkably parallel 
trends until 2002, when treated firms start to show sharper increases in FT4A, narrowing the gap with 
control firms. The pre-regulation trends indicate that the parallel trends assumption is valid. Also 
                                                 
7 The results are robust to including 2002 observations in the pre-regulation sample. 
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noteworthy, control firms show higher FT4As than treated firms throughout the sample period, suggesting 
a negative correlation between board and executive suite independence.  
3.3.  Propensity-Score Matching 
Although the parallel trends during the pre-shock period justify our difference-in-differences 
approach, to improve comparability with the treated firms, we construct a propensity-score matched 
control group following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) based on information in the base-year 2001. Linck, 
Netter, and Yang (2008) argue board independence is related to firm complexity, costs of monitoring, 
ownership incentive, and CEO characteristics. We capture firm complexity by firm size, firm age,8 and 
the number of segments within a firm; costs of monitoring by EBITDA/TA, Tobin’s Q, and board size; 
ownership incentive by a CEO’s percentage share ownership; and CEO characteristics by age, gender, 
founder status, and board chair duality. In addition, we include the number of financial analysts covering 
the firm. Duchin et al. (2010) find an analyst-based variable is related to the likelihood of having a 
dependent board. We also include industry fixed effects. 
Landier et al. (2013) show that a measure similar to FT4A based on the fraction hired is related to 
CEO tenure,9 whether the CEO is hired from outside, the average tenure of top-four non-CEO executives 
(EXECSEN), and the fraction of top-four executives appointed during a CEO's first year in office 
(FT4A_1Y). We include these variables. We also include the fraction of executives whose first year as a 
top-four non-CEO executive can be identified from ExecuComp (KNOWN). 10  This controls noise in 
FT4A and EXECSEN arising from the ambiguity about the precise year of some of the top-four executive 
appointments. To help control noise in FT4A_1Y, we add the fraction of top executives whom we cannot 
determine whether they are appointed during a CEO's first year in office (FT4A_1Y _Unknown).  
                                                 
8 Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) suggest that complexity increases with firm age, and Duchin et al. 
(2010) find that firm age is significantly related to the likelihood of having a dependent board. 
9 If a CEO leaves the position and returns later, ExecuComp reports only the latest appointment date. Thus simply 
comparing the CEO appointment date reported by ExecuComp with the current year may generate negative CEO 
tenure. To correct this problem, we backtrack the previous appointment year using the CEO and company names. 
10 If an executive is already one of the top four non-CEO executives at the firm’s first appearance in ExecuComp, 
we cannot determine the year of her appointment. For such an executive, we use the year the executive joined the 
company as the year she was appointed as a top-four executive. This understates FTA and overstates EXECSEN, 
which is why we include KNOWN as a control variable. 
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Table A-1 in the Online Appendix reports estimation results of the Probit model used to compute 
the propensity score. Consistent with the estimates reported in Duchin et al. (2010) (Table 9, the second 
column), firm age, the number of segments, and the number of analysts all show negative relations to the 
likelihood of having a dependent board. The likelihood of having a dependent board is higher when CEOs 
own more shares, top executives’ average tenure is longer, and CEOs do not chair the board. Log 
likelihood, Prob > Chi2, and Pseudo R2 for the propensity score estimating regression are -282.31, 0.00, 
and 0.14, respectively. Propensity scores calculated from the estimates are then used to match one 
affected firm to the three nearest unaffected firms based on the Mahalanobis distance metric. We exclude 
all observations that do not satisfy the common support condition. We bootstrap 200 times to correct 
standard errors for all OLS regressions estimated with matched samples. 
3.4.  Sample Construction 
Our sample is constructed with NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed firms for which we have information 
on board composition in 2001 from RiskMetrics and on executives from ExecuComp. Other data sources 
include Compustat for accounting data; CRSP for stock return data; and BoardEx for pre-existing social 
ties. To avoid ambiguity about who constitutes the current CEO, we drop firm-year observations when a 
new CEO’s first year overlaps with the last year of the previous CEO. 
The sample period covers 1996 through 2006, excluding 2002. We begin with 1996 to include 
sufficient pre-regulation observations. We stop after 2006 because RiskMetrics modified the definition of 
independent directors in 2007 to conform to the exchanges’ definition, making it difficult to compare the 
level of board independence before and after 2007.  
Table 1 lists, by year, the number of firms in the full sample, which contains 8,975 firm-year 
observations associated with 1,035 unique firms. Columns (3) and (4) report the number of firms in the 
treatment and control group for the unmatched full sample. The number of firms increases over time due 
to greater firm coverage by ExecuComp in later years. Columns (5) - (7) show the propensity score 
matched sample. The number of affected firms in the matched sample is slightly smaller than that in the 
unmatched sample because some affected firms do not satisfy the common support condition. The 
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number of unaffected firms is substantially fewer than three times the number of affected firms because of 
multiple matches to the same unaffected firms.  
3.5.  Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2, Panel A provides summary statistics for the unmatched full sample. The indicator 
Affected has a mean of 0.167, indicating 17% of our sample firms had a dependent board in 2001. The 
post regulation period indicator, Post, has a mean of 0.44, indicating fairly evenly distributed observations 
between pre- and post-regulation periods. The mean and median FT4A are 0.44 and 0.50, implying about 
half of the top-four non-CEO executives are appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. 
Panel B compares affected and unaffected firms for both the unmatched and propensity-score 
matched samples at the time of matching, the base-year 2001. Both samples show significantly smaller 
FT4A for firms with a dependent board than those with an independent board in 2001, suggesting an 
inverse relation between board and executive suite independence. For most of the other variables, the 
difference between treated and control firms is smaller and less significant for the propensity-score 
matched sample (Columns (8) and (9)) than for the unmatched sample (Columns (4) and (5)), indicating 
the propensity score matching improves the comparability between the treatment and control groups. The 
propensity score matched sample also shows insignificant differences between the treatment and control 
groups for the majority of firm and CEO characteristic variables, with a few exceptions that arise because 
the propensity-score matching is based on the overall similarity.  
4. CEO Connectedness in Executive Suites  
4.1. Changes in FT4A 
Table 3 presents estimation results on the regulation’s impact on FT4A. Time-varying control 
variables are similar to those used in the probit model to construct the propensity score. Odd-numbered 
columns report OLS estimates. The coefficient on Affected*Post, the estimated shock effect, is positive 
and significant at 1%, irrespective of whether the sample is unmatched or propensity-score matched. 
Ordered logistic regression estimates, reported in even-numbered columns, are consistent with the OLS 
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results. All estimates imply mandating an independent board significantly increases FT4A. 11  The 
coefficient on Affected*Post in Column (1) implies that the regulation increased FT4A by 0.089. This is 
economically meaningful, when considering the treated firms’ mean FT4A in 2001 was 0.381 (See Table 
2, Panel B). 
Most firms achieved higher FT4A without forcing previous CEOs’ appointees to leave the firm. 
When executives leave a firm, the firm has to provide severance packages and may lose valuable 
firm‐specific knowledge. These costs are avoided when FT4A is increased by promoting or hiring an 
executive to a position higher than previous CEOs’ appointees who occupy the top-four list. A closer look 
at executives dropped from the top-four list during the mandated board restructuring reveals that the vast 
majority remained with the firm post-regulation.12  
Coefficients on control variables are largely consistent across the four regressions. As expected, 
FT4A is positively (negatively) related to the length of CEO’ (the average non-CEO executives’) tenure. 
Interestingly, founder CEOs and CEOs with greater share ownership are associated with lower FT4A, 
while older CEOs tend to have higher FT4A. Larger and older firms tend to have a higher FT4A. 
4.2. Alternative Explanations for Higher FT4A 
This evidence of a higher FT4A indicates a shakeup in executive suites amid the mandated board 
restructuring. In this section we investigate whether alternative stories related to turnovers in executive 
suites and board rooms can explain the higher FT4A.  
4.2.1. Executive Tenure Effects 
Previous CEOs’ appointees tend to have longer tenure, which may make them more vulnerable 
during a shakeup in executive suites. To check whether this tenure bias explains the higher FT4A, we 
separate the executives on the top-four list into current CEO vs. previous CEO appointees. For each group, 
                                                 
11 Since there might be some time-variant omitted variables which are correlated with the treatment, we re-estimate 
the baseline regressions while controlling for firm- and year fixed effects and firm-specific time trend effects, which 
are constructed based on interaction terms between firm fixed effects and the time trend variable. This controls for 
time-variant firm level omitted factors and allow firms to have different time trends. The results are robust. 
12 We identify 455 executives of the treated firms who were dropped from the top-four list between 2001 (pre-
regulation) and 2004 (post-regulation). As of 2004, 327 of them remained with the firm, one died, 39 retired, and 88 
resigned from the firm. 
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we estimate firm-level conditional logistic regressions at the executive level. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if an executive on the top-four list in year t is dropped in year t+1. Control 
variables include firm size, Return, CEO_founder, tenure on the top-four list, and share ownership. 
  The estimation results are reported in Table A-2 in the Online Appendix. Coefficients on the 
standalone executive tenure variable are significant for both sub-groups but with opposite signs. For 
previous CEOs’ appointees, the longer the tenure, the more likely they will be dropped from the list. 
Surprisingly, the opposite holds for current CEOs’ appointees; the longer the tenure, the more likely they 
will stay on the list. Longer tenure works against previous CEOs’ appointees, but helps current CEOs’ 
appointees to stay as CEOs’ top lieutenants. The greater turnover among previous CEOs’ appointees 
could be due to their longer tenure relative to the current CEO’s appointees. Thus, we restrict each 
subsample to only those executives whose tenure in the top-four list is longer than the sample median and 
reestimate the regressions. The results, reported in the last two columns in Table A-2, are robust.  
  Furthermore, the results show that the regulation increased the likelihood of turnover for previous 
CEOs’ appointees but not for the current CEO’s appointees. The tenure-based story cannot explain the 
higher FT4A. If anything, the opposite effects of tenure between previous and current CEOs’ appointees 
demonstrate CEOs’ strong influence on who occupies executive suites. 
4.2.2. Inside Director Turnovers  
When a dependent board becomes independent, some inside directors may lose board seats and 
leave the firm for better opportunities elsewhere. If they are previous CEOs’ appointees on the top-four 
list, FT4A will increase. However, our data show inside directors come out of the restructuring largely 
intact. The higher fraction of independent directors is achieved mostly by replacing “affiliated” directors, 
outside directors with a material relationship with the firm.13 Between 2001 and 2004, treated firms’ 
                                                 
13 On average, treated firms increased the fraction of independent directors from 0.36 in 2001 to 0.56 in 2004, but 
kept the board size more or less the same—9.06 directors in 2001 and 9.28 in 2004. Affiliated directors are non-
independent outside directors, such as a provider of professional services (legal, consulting, or financial services) to 
the company; a customer of, or supplier to the company; a designee, such as a significant shareholder, under a 
documented agreement between the company and a group; a director who controls more than 50% of the company’s 
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average fraction of affiliated directors declined from 0.33 to 0.20, a reduction of 0.13. By contrast, the 
fraction of inside directors declined by only 0.07, from 0.32 in 2001 to 0.25 in 2004.  
Among treated firms covered by both ExecuComp and RiskMetrics in 2001 and 2004, we 
identify 103 top-four non-CEO executives who sat on the board in 2001 but no longer served on the board 
in 2004. Most of them (84) are previous CEOs’ appointees, and the majority (47) remained with the firm 
as of 2004, with the rest leaving the firm due to death (1), retirement (22), and resignation (14). Only 19 
of the 103 are current CEO’s appointees, indicating that inside directors connected to the CEO though 
appointments remain largely intact during the mandated board restructuring. 
4.2.3. CEO Turnover  
If treated firms experience greater CEO turnover and new CEOs bring their own team of top 
executives, their FT4As are likely to increase, which is why all regressions control for the fraction of top-
four non-CEO executives appointed within the year of a new CEO appointment. To make sure, we 
estimate the effect of the board regulation on CEO turnover with firm-level conditional logistic 
regressions with year dummies. The results, reported in Table A-3, show that the regulation has 
insignificant effect on CEO turnover. The shakeup in the executive suite seems to be limited to non-CEO 
top executives. The higher FT4A among treated firms cannot be explained by the CEO turnover story.   
4.3. Changes in CEOs’ Social Connections with Top Executives Appointed during their Tenure  
 If the higher FT4A is a result of CEOs’ attempts to increase their connectedness within executive 
suites, they may opt for individuals with whom they are socially pre-connected. Prior social connection 
per se may not necessarily help obtain a position on the top-four list, but the CEO’s familiarity acquired 
through prior social interactions helps to select individuals more closely aligned, and less likely to dissent.  
We test this prediction by estimating the baseline regressions with CEO-executive social ties as 
the dependent variable, log of one plus the total number of pre-existing network ties current CEOs have 
with their appointees on the top-four list. CEO-executive ties are obtained by manually matching 
                                                                                                                                                             
voting power; a family member of an employee; a former employee of the company or of a majority-owned 
subsidiary; or an employee of an organization or institution that receives charitable gifts from the company. 
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individual names in ExecuComp with those in BoardEx.14 The control variables are the same as in Table 
3, except we add FT4A as a control because the number of network ties a CEO has with his appointees is 
greater the more executives appointed during his tenure. Information on network ties between an 
executive and the CEO is sometimes missing or incomplete because some relevant individuals are not 
covered by BoardEx and the information provided in BoardEx is insufficient to determine whether the 
connections occurred during overlapping years. To avoid reducing the sample size, we assign zero 
connection when the information is missing or incomplete. Because this leads to underestimation of 
network ties, we include the percent of executives appointed by the current CEO with missing or 
incomplete information on their pre-existing network ties to their CEOs. This variable is set to zero when 
a firm-year observation shows no executives are appointed during a current CEO’s tenure.  
Table 4 reports estimation results. Both unmatched and matched samples show significant 
increases in CEOs’ network ties with top executives appointed during their tenure. Social connections 
play a role in appointment decisions because they provide valuable information about personal abilities 
and character unavailable in the public domain. However, this should apply to both treatment and control 
groups and thus cannot explain why the network ties increase more at treated firms post-regulation.   
5. CEOs’ Social Connections in the Board 
Increasing CEO influence in executive suites is not the only way treated firms can counter the 
regulation. They may circumvent the legal requirement by recruiting legally independent but socially 
dependent directors.  
5.1. CEOs’ Social Connections with Independent Directors    
We estimate the shock effect on CEO-director ties with the same baseline regression, with the 
dependent variable equal to the log of one plus total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with 
                                                 
14  Coverage by BoardEx prior to 2000 is quite limited; however, the social ties for years 1996 to 1999 for 
individuals covered by BoardEX in later years can be obtained from BoardEx because it collects information about 
individuals by looking into the past. If a person is first covered in 2002, for example, her education, employment, 
and organization membership history before 2002 is included in the database. Nevertheless, we reestimate the 
baseline regressions using network tie data only from 2000 and find the results are robust. 
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independent directors, Dir_Tie, calculated following a procedure similar to that used in measuring CEO-
executive ties. The control variables are similar to those in Table 4.15  
The estimation results are reported in the first two columns of Table 5. Coefficients on 
Affected*Post are positive for both unmatched and matched samples, but significant only for the 
unmatched sample at the ten percent level. Estimators based on propensity score often generate more 
precise estimates in finite samples (Angrist and Hahn, 2004).  
5.2. CEO-director Social Connections vs. CEO-Executive Appointment-based Connections 
If treated firms are able to circumvent the independent board requirement by recruiting socially-
dependent independent directors, would they still increase the appointment-based CEO connectedness in 
executive suites? To answer this question, we compare CEO-independent director social ties between 
2001 and 2004 for each firm to determine whether CEO-director ties increased after the regulation. Then 
we divide treated firms into those with increased CEO-director ties, Increase_Tie, and those with no 
increase in the ties, No_Increase_Tie, and reestimate the baseline regression for FT4A while interacting 
these indicators with Affected*Post.  
The estimation results are reported in the last two columns of Table 5. The effect of the regulation 
on FT4A is positive and significant only when CEO-director ties do not increase. When CEO-director ties 
increase, the regulation has no effect on FT4A. Firms do not seem to increase appointment-based CEO-
executive connectedness when they are able to recruit socially-dependent independent directors to meet 
the regulatory requirement.  
6. Firm Performance Analyses 
Do changes in executive suite independence in response to the regulation affect firm 
performance? To address this issue, we measure firm performance by EBITDA/TA, EBITDA divided by 
                                                 
15 Some modifications are necessary for switching from CEO-executive ties to CEO-director ties. We control for the 
number of independent directors, Num_Ind_Dir, instead of FTA because the number of pre-existing network ties is 
likely to increase with more independent directors. We also exclude variables specifically related to FTA; FTA_1Y, 
FTA_1Y_Unknown, KNOWN, EXECSEN, and Pct_Miss_FTA_1Y_Tie. And instead of Pct_Miss_FTA_Tie, we 
include Dir_Tie_Unknown, the percent of independent directors whose pre-existing network ties to their CEOs are 
either missing or incomplete. 
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the book value of total assets, and Tobin’s Q. We compute their changes from pre-regulation to post-
regulation periods, ∆EBITDA/TA and ∆Q, by taking the difference in their averages for up to four years 
over 1998-2001 and 2003-2006. Changes in FT4A, ∆FT4Ai, are computed the same way. Only 
observations in which a CEO was the CEO in 2001 are included to avoid having different CEOs of a 
same firm in the estimation. To construct the changes, the panel data is collapsed to cross-sectional data 
such that each observation is associated with one firm.  
Control variables include changes in firm size, ∆Ln(TotalAssets); changes in firm risk as 
measured by idiosyncratic risk, ∆Risk; and changes in board size, ∆Boardsize. To avoid reducing the 
sample size due to missing observations, we set ∆Risk equal to zero if they are missing, and use a dummy 
variable, ∆RiskD, which is set to one if ∆Risk is available and zero otherwise. We do not control for CEO 
characteristics because we have the same CEO for each firm. Because the regressions are cross-sectional, 
standard errors are clustered at the industry level based on the one-digit SIC code. 
Table 6 reports estimation results for the full sample in Columns (1) and (4). Coefficients on the 
standalone ∆FT4A are significantly negative for ∆EBITDA/TA and negative but only marginally 
significant for ∆Q. These results are consistent with the finding in Landier et al. (2013) that the fraction of 
top executives hired by current CEOs is negatively correlated to firm performance.  
Our main interests are, however, on the effects of regulation-induced changes in FT4A on firm 
performance and how they vary across information environments. We construct an information cost index 
in the base year 2001. It relies on three widely-used proxies: (1) The number of analysts (source: I/B/E/S). 
Analyst coverage is generally believed to reduce information asymmetry. (2) Asset intangibility, as 
measured by intangible assets divided by total assets. Intangible assets are considered to be more difficult 
to evaluate than tangible assets (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1991). (3) Stock return volatility, as measured by 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns. The volatility is commonly used to measure fundamental 
uncertainty (e.g., Boone et al., 2007). Because these three factors have different scales, we normalize 
them by assigning a value of one to three based on which third a firm belongs to in each factor. Higher 
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values indicate higher information costs. 16 Because these factors may be correlated, we follow Armstrong 
et al. (2014) and employ the principle component analysis to construct the information cost index, 
InfoCost_Index, for all firms in 2001.  
We use this information cost index to divide the sample into high- and low information cost 
subsamples using the sample median. Table 6, Columns (2) and (5) report reestimation results for the 
high information cost subsample. The coefficient on the standalone Affected is negative for both 
∆EBITDA/TA and ∆Q but significant only for ∆EBITDA/TA. These results are consistent with the findings 
in Duchin et al. (2010) that for firms in high information cost environments, forcing dependent boards to 
become independent hurts firm performance.  
The variable of main interest, ∆FT4A*Affected, shows positive and significant coefficients for 
both ∆EBITDA/TA and ∆Q, supporting Prediction 2 that increases in CEO connectedness with top 
executives help negate the negative shock effect on firm performance in a high information cost 
environment. For the low information cost subsample, neither the standalone Affected nor ∆FT4A*Affected 
shows a significant coefficient on either performance measure.  
7. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Other Robustness Tests 
In this section we examine confounding effects of events occurred around 2002 and conduct a 
battery of robustness tests.   
7.1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 Our main concern is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was enacted in 2002 while the independent 
board requirement proposal was under consideration by the SEC. If the SOX also contributed to the 
higher FT4A, then we over-estimate the effects of the shock. To check whether and how our results are 
affected by the SOX, we (1) conduct placebo tests using firms exempted from the independent board 
requirement but subject to other SOX requirements (2) reestimate the baseline regression with a sample of 
firms exempted from Section 404 of the SOX but subject to the independent board requirement.  
                                                 
16 For example, we assign three to the bottom-third in the number of analysts and to the top-third in the fraction of 
intangible assets and in stock return volatility. 
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7.1.1.    Placebo Tests 
Our placebo tests follow Armstrong et al. (2014) and use a sample of “controlled” firms. Firms 
are defined as controlled when more than 50% of the voting power in electing directors is held by an 
individual, a group, or another company. These firms are exempted from the independent board 
requirement but are required to comply with other governance requirements including SOX (Armstrong et 
al., 2014); that is, they are not treated by the board regulation but were treated by the SOX and other 
possible confounding effects. We identify controlled firms by virtue of the 50% ownership rule as those 
in which directors and officers own more than 50% of the shares. As in Armstrong et al. (2014), firms 
with dual class shares are also considered controlled firms. The D&O share ownership is obtained from 
Compact Disclosure, and firms with dual class shares are identified using the dataset provided in Andrew 
Metrick’s website and described in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008). 
Table 7, Panel A, reports placebo test results. The first column reports reestimation of Table 3 
using only controlled firms. Here treated (control) firms are controlled firms with a non-majority 
(majority) of independent directors in 2001. Control variables are the same as in Table 3 but not reported. 
The coefficient on Affected*Post is virtually zero.17 In the second column, we utilize the full sample, 
including controlled firms and non-controlled firms matched to controlled firms using the propensity-
score matching process described earlier. We then add a triple interaction term, Affected*Post*Exempt, 
where Exempt is an indicator for controlled firms. The coefficient on the triple interaction term is negative 
and significant, indicating significantly lower FT4A for controlled firms relative to non-controlled firms, 
which show significantly positive increases in FT4A. The magnitudes of the negative and positive 
coefficients are similar; indicating the net effect on controlled firms is zero. That is, firms treated by the 
SOX but untreated by the board regulation show no increase in FT4A, refuting the possibility that our 
results are affected by the SOX. 
7.1.2.    Reestimation with a Sample of Firms Exempted from Section 404 of the SOX  
                                                 
17 Our sample of controlled firms is smaller than that in Armstrong et al. (2014) because we require coverage by 
both ExecuComp and RiskMetrics.  
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Another way to distinguish the effect of the board regulation from that of the SOX is to examine 
firms treated by the regulation but untreated by the most important component of the SOX, Section 404. 
Firms with public floats less than $75 million are exempt from Section 404, which is considered so 
onerous that Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman (2009) argue it provides an unintended incentive for small firms 
to stay small. If the higher FT4A were driven by the SOX, this subsample of firms should exhibit little or 
no treatment effects. We define public float as the market value of equity held by non-affiliates of the 
issuer, estimating it by the market value of common equity multiplied by (1 - D&O share ownership). We 
use the market cap as of the end of the second quarter of the fiscal year of 2002. 18  When D&O 
ownership is missing, we use the 2002 sample mean of 14%. This process yields 30 firms with estimated 
public floats less than $75 million.  
The reestimation results of the baseline regression for this small subsample are reported in Panel 
B of Table 7. To make full use of the limited sample, estimation in Column (1) is done without any 
control variables other than firm and year fixed effects. Column (2) is estimated with the same set of 
control variables as before. We use only the unmatched subsample because the propensity-score matched 
subsample contains only six firms. In spite of the small sample size, difference-in-differences estimates 
for FT4A remain positive and significant in both specifications.  
7.2. Other Possible Confounding Events 
Other events, such as the dotcom bubble burst in 2000 and the 9/11 attack in 2001, occurred 
around the time the board regulation was promulgated. Those events may have led to fewer top executive 
hires and promotions during 2000-2002, lowering FT4A during 2000-2002, in turn leading to the 
appearance of higher FT4A in later years. If treated firms are more affected by these confounding effects, 
then our results will be overestimated. We check this possibility by following the approach used in 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), replacing the post-regulation indicator, Post, with year dummies 2000, 
                                                 
18 On September 4, 2002, the SEC adopted final rules regarding the acceleration of filing deadlines, wherein the 
definition of non-accelerated filers is an issuer with a public float less than $75 million on the last business day of 
the most recent second fiscal quarter. 
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2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005 and after.  The reestimation results, reported in Table A-4, suggest that our 
results are not confounded by those events in 2000 and 2001. 
7.3.  Different  Degrees of Treatment  
Our estimations are based on a treatment indicator, Affectedi, which may be too crude. Consider 
two treated firms, one with 40% and another with 10% of independent directors in 2001. Clearly, the 
latter is more affected by the regulation and may react more strongly. We reestimate the baseline 
regression for FT4A with the interaction of the percentage of non-independent directors in 2001, 
Pct_Affectedi, and the post-regulation indicator, Post. Estimation results, reported in Panel A of Table A-
5, show that the more affected by the regulation, the greater the increase in FT4A, irrespective of whether 
the sample is unmatched or matched. 
7.4.  Alternative Definitions of FT4A 
Executives with higher salaries and bonuses tend to be higher ranked and more influential; hence, 
connections with them may matter more. We calculate a compensation-weighted FT4A, 
WFT4Ait  =      Exe_Comkit  /         Exe_Comjit.                                                                        (2) 
Exe_Comkit is the sum of salaries and bonuses of executive k appointed during the tenure of firm i’s CEO 
as of year t, and n is the number of top executives appointed during the CEO’s tenure.  
In addition, we estimate residuals of a regression relating FT4A to CEOTEN, OUTSIDE, 
EXECSEN, KNOWN, FT4A_1Y, and FT4A_1Y_Unknown with year fixed effects. The residuals are used 
as a measure of the abnormal fraction of top executives appointed, AFT4A, during a CEO’s tenure. We 
also calculate AFT4A weighted by executives’ salaries and bonuses, WAFT4A, by estimating the same 
regression with WFT4A as the dependent variable. When these abnormal measures of FT4A are used as 
dependent variables, we do not include independent variables used to estimate the residuals as control 
variables. Reestimation results based on these three alternative measures of FT4A are reported in Panel B 
of Table A-5. The regulatory impact variable shows a highly significant coefficient regardless of which 
alternative measure is used.  
7.5. Corporate Organizational Structure-Changing Events 
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M&As, divestitures, and spinoffs are often accompanied by changes in the executive suite. Thus, 
we add the number of M&As and divestitures and spinoffs completed in the prior year as additional 
controls. The data are obtained from SDC. The reestimation results (unreported) are robust.  
7.6.  Alternative Sample Construction  
Finally, we check the robustness to possible biases arising from an unbalanced sample by 
reestimating regressions with a balanced sample of 830 firms that exist over the period 1999 through 
2006. We exclude observations in 2002 and 2003 so that the pre- and post-regulation periods comprise 
the same number of years (three years in each). In this sample, 2004 is the first year fully affected by the 
regulation. The rest is the same. The reestimation results (unreported) are robust. 
8. Conclusions  
We find that when firms experience an external shock to increase board independence, they 
respond by increasing CEO connectedness in the executive suite. The spillover is not limited to the 
executive suite, however. The shock also seems to weaken social independence of independent directors. 
Interestingly, these spillovers do not occur at the same time. When treated firms increase CEO-
independent director social ties, they do not increase CEO connectedness in executive suites, suggesting 
they are substitutes. 
These findings have clear implications for investors, corporate governance specialists, and policy 
makers: Inferring the overall independence of a firm’s governing process by board independence alone is 
misleading. When policy makers target a specific governance mechanism for improvement, they must be 
aware their regulatory actions could spill over to other governing bodies and to other aspects of 
governance within the targeted mechanism. Such spillovers are often difficult to predict and some could 
be harmful. Thus, when it comes to governance reforms, the “comply or explain” approach taken in many 
European, and some Asian, countries presents an appealing feature absent in the legally binding 
regulation approach typically taken in the U.S.19     
                                                 
19 See Kim and Lu (2013) for detailed documentation of major corporate governance reforms undertaken by 26 
advanced and emerging economies. 
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Finally, a caveat is in order. We consider only top echelon employees of the firm—top executives 
and board members. The board and the executive suite are not the only governing bodies. Non-managerial 
employees also influence the governing process through their working relationships with management 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), the collective bargaining process (Atanassov and Kim, 2009), and 
worker productivity and involvement in anti-takeover activities (Kim and Ouimet, 2014). The possible 
dynamics among the three governing bodies, with the board representing shareholders, employees 
representing their own collective interest, and the executive suite managing often conflicting interests 
between capital providers and labor suppliers, are intriguing and complex. More research is needed on the 
three-way dynamics for a more comprehensive understanding of how the interdependence between the 
three groups affect a firm’s overall governing process.  
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Appendix:  
 
Variable Descriptions. 
 Board Composition Variables 
Affected 
 
Dependent board indicator equal to one if a firm does not have a majority of 
independent directors in 2001; zero, otherwise. 
Pct_Dep_Dir The percentage of non-independent directors on the board in 2001. 
Executive Suite Composition Variables 
FT4A Fraction of top-four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure.  
AFT4A Abnormal fraction of top-four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure.  
WFT4A 
 
Fraction of top-four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure, 
weighted by the sum of executives’ salaries and bonuses. 
WAFT4A 
 
Abnormal fraction of top-four non-CEO executives appointed during a current 
CEO’s tenure, weighted by the sum of executives’ salaries and bonuses. 
Ln(Exe_Tie+1) 
 
 
 
 
Ln(Dir_Tie+1) 
 
 
 
 
Logged value of Exe_Tie plus one. Exe_Tie is the total number of pre-existing 
network ties a CEO has with top-four non-CEO executives appointed during his 
tenure through past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the 
board), educational institutions, and past membership to social and professional 
organizations. Only network ties established during overlapping years are included. 
Logged value of Dir_Tie plus one. Dir_Tie is the total number of pre-existing 
network ties a CEO has with his firm’s independent directors through past 
employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board), educational 
institutions, and past membership to social and professional organizations. Only 
network ties established during overlapping years are included. 
Other Variables 
Post Post-regulation indicator, equal to one if year t is 2003 or thereafter; zero, otherwise. 
InfoCost_Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An index for the initial level of outsiders’ cost of acquiring firm specific information 
in 2001. It consists of three factors related to the difficulty in acquiring firm-specific 
information: (1) the number of analysts covering the firm; (2) intangible assets 
divided by total assets; and (3) stock return volatility. Each factor is normalized to 
the value of one to three based on which third it belongs to (e.g., the maximum value 
of three is assigned to the bottom third in the number of analysts and to the top third 
in the fraction of intangible assets and in stock return volatility). Then we employ 
the Principle Component Analysis to construct InfoCost_Index for all firms in 2001. 
Higher index indicates higher cost for outsiders to acquire firm-specific information. 
OUTSIDE 
 
Outsider indicator equal to one, if a CEO comes from outside the firm; zero, 
otherwise. 
FT4A_1Y 
 
Fraction of top-four non-CEO executives appointed within the year of a new CEO 
appointment. 
FT4A_1Y_Unknown 
 
Fraction of top-four non-CEO executives whose information on whether they are 
appointed within the year of a new CEO appointment is unknown. 
KNOWN 
 
Fraction of executives whose first year on the list of the top-four non-CEO 
executives can be identified with data in ExecuComp. 
EXECSEN Average tenure of top-four non-CEO executives. 
Female Indicator equal to one if a CEO is female; zero, otherwise. 
Ln(CEOAge) Logged value of CEO age. 
CEO_OWN Percentage of outstanding common shares held by a CEO. 
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CEO_Chair Indicator equal to one if a CEO chairs the board; zero, otherwise. 
CEO_Founder Indicator equal to one if a CEO is a founder; zero, otherwise. 
Ln(TotalAssets) Logged book value of total assets in 2000 US million dollars. 
FirmAge 
 
One plus the number of years from the firm’s IPO or the number of years since its 
first appearance in CRSP.  
Segment 
 
Number of business segments a firm has in a given year as reported by 
Compustat/Segment. 
Pct_Miss_FT4A_Tie 
 
Percent of top-four non-CEO executives appointed during a CEO’s tenure whose 
network ties to their CEO are missing or incomplete. 
Tobin’s Q 
 
The market value of common equity plus the book value of total liabilities divided 
by the book value of total assets. 
EBITDA/TA 
 
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization divided by the book 
value of total assets. 
Risk 
 
The standard error of the residuals from a CAPM model estimated using daily data 
over the concurrent year. It is equal to zero, if data to construct Risk are unavailable.  
RiskD Dummy variable equal to one if the data required to estimate Risk are available; zero, otherwise.  
Boardsize Total number of directors on the board.  
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Figure 1: Time Trends of FT4As of Firms Affected and Unaffected by the Independent 
Board Requirement. 
 
This figure plots the yearly mean FT4As of firm affected and unaffected during the sample 
period of 1996 through 2006.  
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Table 1: Sample Description. 
 
This table shows, by year, the number of observations for unmatched and propensity-score 
matched samples. Columns (2) and (5) report the number of firms for which we have 
information on both board composition in 2001 and the fraction of top-four non-CEO 
executives appointed (FT4A) during a CEO’s tenure. Columns (3) and (6) report the number 
of firms without a majority of independent directors in 2001 and, hence, affected by the 
regulation. Columns (4) and (7) show the number of firms unaffected by the regulation.  
 
 
Unmatched Sample Propensity-score Matched Sample 
 Year Full Affected Unaffected Full  Affected Unaffected 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1996 691 106 585 267 102 165 
1997 755 113 642 292 108 184 
1998 825 128 697 332 123 209 
1999 913 147 766 368 143 225 
2000 946 156 790 382 151 231 
2001 944 157 787 387 155 232 
2003 958 164 794 378 150 228 
2004 969 171 798 382 152 230 
2005 978 171 807 378 150 228 
2006 996 182 814 374 152 222 
Total 8,975 1,495 7,480 3,540 1,386 2,154 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Panel A reports summary statistics of key variables for the full sample. Panel B compares affected firms with 
unaffected firms in the unmatched and the propensity-score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The 
comparison is based on the mean values of variables in the base-year 2001. Definitions of the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board Composition Variables 
Affected 0.167 0.000 0.373 0.000 1.000 
Pct_Dep_Dir 0.351 0.333 0.176 0.063 1.000 
Executive Suite Composition Variables 
FT4A 0.437 0.500 0.334 0.000 1.000 
Ln(Exe_Tie+1) 0.064 0.000 0.237 0.000 2.639 
Pct_Miss_FT4A_Tie 0.041 0.000 0.181 0.000 1.000 
Other Variables 
Post 0.435 0.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 
CEOTEN 6.920 5.000 7.334 0.000 55.000 
OUTSIDE 0.142 0.000 0.349 0.000 1.000 
CEO_Founder 0.090 0.000 0.286 0.000 1.000 
FT4A_1Y 0.538 0.500 0.399 0.000 1.000 
KNOWN 0.973 1.000 0.093 0.000 1.000 
EXECSEN 4.350 4.000 1.872 0.000 14.750 
FT4A_1Y_Unknown 0.001 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.500 
Female 0.013 0.000 0.113 0.000 1.000 
Ln(CEOAge) 4.015 4.025 0.135 3.466 4.511 
CEO_OWN 0.023 0.003 0.060 0.000 0.638 
CEO_Chair 0.657 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 
Ln(TotalAssets) 7.765 7.599 1.657 2.227 14.291 
FirmAge 26.830 23.000 19.571 1.000 82.000 
Segment 15.036 14.000 9.695 1.000 87.000 
Tobin's Q 2.195 1.564 2.899 0.475 105.090 
Risk 0.022 0.019 0.013 0.000 0.196 
RiskD 0.936 1.000 0.245 0.000 1.000 
Boardsize 9.795 9.000 2.842 4.000 30.000 
Ln(Dir_Tie+1) 0.481 0.000 0.702 0.000 3.332 
Dir_Tie_Unknow 0.048 0.000 0.158 0.000 1.000 
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Panel B: Comparison between Affected and Unaffected Firms in Unmatched and PS-matched Samples.  
 
Unmatched Sample PS-matched Sample  
 
Affected Unaffected (2)-(3) P-Value Affected Unaffected (6)-(7) P-Value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FT4A 0.381 0.470 -0.090 0.002 0.381 0.457 -0.076  0.019  
Ln(Exe_Tie+1) 0.070 0.061 0.009 0.673 0.070 0.069 0.002  0.952 
Pct_Miss_FT4A_Tie 0.017 0.029 -0.012 0.334 0.017 0.023 -0.006  0.649   
CEOTEN 9.847 6.050 3.798 0.000 9.594 6.784 2.809  0.002 
OUTSIDE 0.191 0.141 0.050 0.108 0.181 0.129 0.051   0.166 
CEO_Founder 0.205 0.070 0.136 0.000 0.195 0.121 0.074  0.048 
FT4A_1Y 0.572 0.512 0.059 0.083 0.573 0.524 0.049   0.235    
KNOWN 0.971 0.976 -0.004 0.589 0.973 0.986 -0.013  0.089  
EXECSEN 4.909 4.193 0.716 0.000 4.880 4.348 0.532  0.004 
FT4A_1Y_Unknown 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.999 0.002 0.000 0.002  0.222   
Female 0.006 0.014 -0.008 0.438 0.006 0.013 -0.006  0.538 
Ln(CEOAge) 4.034 4.002 0.032 0.011 4.032 3.997 0.035   0.019 
CEO_OWN 0.052 0.019 0.033 0.000 0.048 0.021 0.027   0.000  
CEO_Chair 0.605 0.685 -0.080 0.052 0.600 0.655 -0.055   0.271  
Ln(TotalAssets) 7.400 7.813 -0.414 0.004 7.420 7.443 -0.023  0.881 
FirmAge 19.541 27.314 -7.773 0.000 19.594 21.940 -2.346   0.128 
Segment 14.929 17.949 -3.020 0.000 15.046 16.767 -1.721  0.036 
Tobin's Q 2.127 2.034 0.093 0.510 2.131 1.882 0.249  0.074 
EBITDA/TA 0.133 0.122 0.012 0.248 0.134 0.135 -0.001  0.897 
Risk 0.032 0.030 0.002 0.123 0.032 0.032 -0.001  0.657 
RiskD 0.936 0.939 -0.003 0.898 0.935 0.991 -0.056  0.002 
Boardsize 9.599 9.668 -0.070 0.787 9.626 9.392 0.234  0.411 
Ln(Dir_Tie+1) 0.193 0.557 -0.364 0.000   0.195 0.428 -0.232  0.000 
Dir_Tie_Unknow 0.005 0.019 -0.014 0.131   0.005 0.019 -0.014  0.128 
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Table 3: Impact of the Independent Board Requirement on the Fraction of Top Executives 
Appointed (FT4A) during a CEO’s Tenure. 
 
This table reports estimates of the impact of the independent board requirement on the fraction of top-four 
non-CEO executives appointed (FT4A) during a CEO’s tenure. Columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) report estimation 
results with the unmatched and propensity-score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 
2006, excluding 2002. Columns (1) and (3) are OLS estimates; Columns (2) and (4), estimates by ordered logistic 
regressions. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Regressions in Columns (1) and (3) control 
for year- and firm fixed effects and regressions in Columns (2) and (4) control for year- and firm dummies. The 
regression does not include Affected and Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level in Columns (1)-(2) and are corrected by 
bootstrapping 200 times in Columns (3)-(4). Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
FT4A 
 
Unmatched PS-Matched 
 OLS Ologit OLS Ologit VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Affected*Post 0.089*** 1.049*** 0.043*** 0.444** 
 
(0.022) (0.307) (0.014) (0.222) 
CEOTEN 0.023*** 0.390*** 0.020*** 0.375*** 
 
(0.003) (0.055) (0.002) (0.052) 
OUTSIDE 0.012 -0.053 -0.069** -1.506*** 
 
(0.033) (0.479) (0.035) (0.511) 
CEO_Founder -0.313*** -4.642*** -0.184*** -2.946*** 
 
(0.064) (0.997) (0.044) (0.739) 
FT4A_1Y 0.051 0.468 0.066* 0.842 
 
(0.037) (0.577) (0.037) (0.571) 
KNOWN -0.306*** -4.395*** -0.462*** -7.878*** 
 
(0.059) (0.806) (0.058) (0.899) 
EXECSEN -0.092*** -1.375*** -0.096*** -1.619*** 
 
(0.003) (0.063) (0.003) (0.071) 
FT4A_1Y_Unknown 0.818 5.944 -0.617*** -13.317*** 
 
(0.594) (19.557) (0.230) (3.494) 
Female -0.092 -1.411 0.018 -0.131 
 
(0.094) (1.302) (0.115) (1.920) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.268*** 3.896*** 0.234*** 2.512** 
 
(0.095) (1.318) (0.080) (1.191) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.277* -3.658 -0.541*** -7.738*** 
 
(0.161) (2.273) (0.158) (2.619) 
CEO_Chair 0.023 0.193 0.023 0.034 
 
(0.028) (0.406) (0.025) (0.457) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.045** 0.754*** 0.049*** 1.001*** 
 
(0.018) (0.202) (0.014) (0.192) 
FirmAge 0.003** 0.033** 0.003* 0.049** 
 
(0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.024) 
Segmentt-1 -0.001 -0.016 0.000 0.004 
 
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.012) 
Constant1 -0.288 4.063 0.013 -5.552 
 
(0.427) (5.449) (0.316) (5.010) 
Constant2 
 
7.084 
 
-2.299 
  
(5.458)  (5.000) Constant3  10.212*  1.412 
  
(5.462)  (4.981) Constant4  13.857**  5.631 
  (5.476)  (4.966) Firm FE & Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,304 6,304 2,695 2,695 
Adjusted R2 0.701 (0.4663) 0.742 (0.5166) 
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Table 4: Impact of the Independent Board Requirement on the Social Ties between a CEO and 
Top-four Non-CEO Executives Appointed during the CEO’s Tenure. 
 
This table estimates the impact of the independent board requirement on the social ties between a CEO 
and top-four non-CEO executives appointed during the CEO’s tenure. Columns (1) and (2) report 
estimation results with the unmatched and propensity-score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The 
sample period is 1996 – 2006, excluding 2002. Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. 
All regressions control for firm- and year fixed effects. The regression does not include Affected and 
Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at the firm level in Columns (1) and are corrected by bootstrapping 200 times in 
Columns (2). Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Ln(Exe_Tie+1) 
 
Unmatched PS-Matched 
  (1) (2) 
Affected*Post 0.038* 0.051*** 
 
(0.020) (0.017) 
CEOTEN 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
OUTSIDE 0.053** 0.046 
 
(0.023) (0.029) 
CEO_Founder 0.043 0.026 
 
(0.033) (0.035) 
FT4A_1Y -0.001 0.026 
 
(0.025) (0.023) 
FT4A_1Y_Unknown -0.272 -0.046 
 
(0.253) (0.180) 
KNOWN -0.058 -0.150** 
 
(0.053) (0.071) 
EXECSEN -0.004 -0.006 
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Female 0.085*** -0.015 
 
(0.031) (0.015) 
Ln(CEOAge) -0.042 -0.068 
 
(0.063) (0.083) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -0.070 -0.150 
 
(0.107) (0.146) 
CEO_Chair -0.022 -0.016 
 
(0.013) (0.018) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.018** 0.017 
 
(0.009) (0.014) 
FirmAge -0.000 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Segmentt-1 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Pct_Miss_FT4A_Tie -0.023 -0.031 
 
(0.021) (0.029) 
FT4A 0.034* -0.001 
 
(0.021) (0.025) 
Constant 0.125 0.403 
 
(0.282) (0.383) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y 
Observations 6,304 2,695 
Adjusted R2 0.436 0.471 
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Table 5: CEO-Independent Director Social Ties and the Fraction of Top Executives Appointed (FT4A) 
during the CEO’s Tenure. 
 
This table estimates the impact of the independent board requirement on pre-existing network ties between the CEO and 
independent directors and how the impact on FT4A is related to the changes in CEO-director ties. The first two columns 
estimate the impact of the regulation on CEO-independent director social ties. The last two columns estimate the 
interactive effects of the regulation and changes in CEO-director ties on FT4A. Increase_Tie is an indicator equal to one, 
if CEO-director ties increased from 2001 to 2004; No_Increase_Tie is an indicator equal to one, if there is no increase in 
CEO-director ties over the same period. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, excluding 2002. Definitions of all variables 
are provided in the Appendix. All regressions control for firm- and year fixed effects. The regression does not include 
Dep_Board2001 and Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at the firm level in Columns (1) and (3) and are corrected by bootstrapping 200 times in 
Columns (2) and (4). Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Ln(Dir_Tie+1) FT4A 
 
Unmatched PS-matched Unmatched PS-matched 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Affected*Post 0.021 0.041* 
  
 
(0.042) (0.024) 
  Increase_Tie*Affected*Post 
  
0.044 -0.012 
   
(0.089) (0.047) 
No_Increase_Tie*Affected*Post 
  
0.090*** 0.040** 
   
(0.022) (0.016) 
Increase_Tie*Post 
  
-0.002 0.036 
   
(0.036) (0.034) 
CEOTEN 0.005 0.006*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
OUTSIDE 0.035 0.058 -0.004 -0.105*** 
 
(0.063) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) 
CEO_Founder -0.190** -0.198*** -0.299*** -0.148*** 
 
(0.096) (0.050) (0.069) (0.044) 
FT4A_1Y 
  
0.023 0.054 
   
(0.038) (0.038) 
KNOWN 
  
-0.319*** -0.484*** 
   
(0.064) (0.051) 
EXECSEN 
  
-0.090*** -0.095*** 
   
(0.003) (0.003) 
FT4A_1Y_Unknown 
  
-0.103 -0.828*** 
   
(0.591) (0.256) 
Female 0.136 0.449*** -0.032 0.236 
 
(0.119) (0.145) (0.134) (0.144) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.621*** 0.552*** 0.311*** 0.346*** 
 
(0.179) (0.087) (0.103) (0.081) 
CEO_OWNt-1 0.475** 0.670*** -0.294 -0.649*** 
 
(0.237) (0.211) (0.194) (0.200) 
CEO_Chair -0.034 -0.038 0.014 0.014 
 
(0.051) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 0.009 0.011 0.038* 0.037*** 
 
(0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) 
FirmAge 0.004 0.004 0.003** 0.003* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Segmentt-1 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dir_Tie_Unknow -0.461*** -0.355*** 
  
 
(0.127) (0.058) 
  Num_IndDir 0.048*** 0.061*** 
  
 
(0.008) (0.005) 
  Constant -2.647*** -2.547*** -0.395 -0.301 
 
(0.741) (0.372) (0.469) (0.312) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5,739 2449 5,589 2,448 
Adjusted R2 0.795 0.786 0.698 0.745 
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Table 6: Performance Analyses. 
 
This table estimates how changes in FT4A, ∆FT4A, attributable to the independent board requirement 
affect firm performance, separately for high- and low-information cost environment. The dependent 
variables are changes in EBTDA/TA in Columns (1)-(3); Tobin’s Q in Columns (4)-(6). The sample is 
cross-sectional and each observation is the difference in the averages of up to four years over 1998-2001 
and 2003-2006 that overlap with the tenure of each CEO who was the CEO in 2001. Regressions in 
Columns (1) and (4) are estimated on the full sample. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) are estimated on 
subsamples, separated into firms with high- and low-information costs by the sample median of InfoCost 
index, which measures the initial level of outsiders’ cost of acquiring firm specific information in 2001. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses 
are clustered at the industry level, as defined by one-digit SIC code. Coefficients marked with *, **, and 
*** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
∆EBITDA/TA ∆Tobin's Q 
 
Full High_InfoCost Low_InfoCost Full High_InfoCost Low_InfoCost 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆FT4A*Affected 0.052 0.085** -0.056 1.062 2.172*** 1.043 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.038) (0.662) (0.595) (1.287) 
Affected -0.012 -0.032* 0.022 -0.212 -0.395 -0.116 
 
(0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.150) (0.232) (0.244) 
∆FT4A -0.022*** -0.036 -0.015 -1.234 -0.816* -1.995* 
 
(0.007) (0.019) (0.010) (0.699) (0.411) (1.141) 
∆n(TotalAsset) -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 -1.517*** -1.493*** -1.648** 
 
(0.014) (0.024) (0.012) (0.387) (0.236) (0.626) 
∆Risk -0.677 -0.487 -0.615 -19.029 21.877 -91.648 
 
(0.383) (0.889) (0.396) (32.507) (34.940) (98.993) 
∆RiskD 0.027 0.032 0.026** -1.019 -2.240 0.497 
 
(0.019) (0.052) (0.009) (0.978) (1.874) (0.679) 
∆Boardsize -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.005 -0.008 0.046 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.074) (0.091) (0.048) 
Constant -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 0.254* 0.279** 0.162 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.005) (0.113) (0.111) (0.261) 
Observations 739 313 317 644 293 256 
Adjusted R2 0.000 -0.012 -0.007 0.097 0.112 0.116 
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Table 7: Placebo Tests: Firms Exempted from the Independent Board Requirement and 
Firms Exempted from Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
Panel A reports results of placebo tests using “controlled” firms, which are exempt from the 
independent board requirement but are required to comply with other governance requirements of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Firms are considered “controlled” if directors and officers own more than 
50% of outstanding shares or if a firm has ducal class shares. Column (1) reestimates the baseline 
regression in Table 3 using only firms exempted from the board regulation. Column (2) utilizes the 
full sample, including exempt firms and non-exempt firms matched to the exempt firms by 
propensity scores. Exempted is an indicator for firms classified as “controlled” in 2001. The 
regressions contain the same control variables as in Table 3 but are not reported. 
  
Panel B reestimates the impact of the independent board requirement on FT4A using a subsample 
of firms with public float less than $75 Million in 2002. These firms are exempted from Section 
404 of the SOX. Column (1) does not include any control variables except fixed effects, while 
Column (2) includes the same control variables as in Table 3 (unreported). Coefficients marked 
with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Placebo Tests Using Controlled Firms exempt from the Independent Board 
Requirement. 
 
FT4A 
  Controlled Firms Only  
Controlled_Matched 
Sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Affected*Post -0.001 0.102*** 
 
(0.044) (0.031) 
Affected*Post*Exempted 
 
-0.083** 
  
(0.041) 
Post*Exempted 
 
0.024 
  
(0.020) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y 
Observations 647 1,810 
Adjusted R2 0.803 0.763 
 
Panel B: Reestimation of the Baseline Model for Firms Exempt from Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 
FT4A 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Affected*Post 0.426** 0.136* 
 
(0.161) (0.081) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y 
Observations 120 95 
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.859 
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Table A-1: The Matching Regression 
 
This table estimates the regression for constructing the propensity score matched sample 
based on observations in 2001. The dependent variable, Affected, is an indicator equal to 
one if a firm does not have a majority of independent directors in 2001; zero otherwise. The 
regression controls for industry fixed effects at the one-digit SIC code level. Definitions of 
all variables are provided in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 
Affected 
VARIABLES  (1) 
CEOTEN 0.019 
 
(0.012) 
OUTSIDE -0.073 
 
(0.191) 
CEO_Founder -0.005 
 
(0.265) 
FT4A_1Y -0.222 
 
(0.184) 
KNOWN 0.896 
 
(0.846) 
EXECSEN 0.118*** 
 
(0.036) 
FT4A_1Y_Unknown 0.466 
 
(2.347) 
Female -0.418 
 
(0.599) 
Ln(CEOAge) 0.279 
 
(0.479) 
CEO_OWNt-1 3.796*** 
 
(1.079) 
CEO_Chair -0.315** 
 
(0.132) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 -0.031 
 
(0.057) 
FirmAge -0.013*** 
 
(0.004) 
Segmentt-1 -0.014* 
 
(0.008) 
EBITDA/TA 0.312 
 
(0.632) 
TobinQ -0.008 
 
(0.051) 
Boardsize 0.041 
 
(0.028) 
Ln(Num_Analyst) -0.062 
 
(0.071) 
Constant -3.083 
 
(2.074) 
Industry FE Y 
Log likelihood -282.314 
Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Observations 718 
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Table A-2: The Likelihood an Executive Will Be Dropped from the Top-Four List: Current CEOs’ 
Appointees vs. Previous CEOs’ Appointees. 
 
This table estimates the impact of the independent board requirement on the likelihood a top-four non-
CEO executive will be dropped from the top-four list, separately for current CEOs’ appointees, 
AppointCurCEO, and previous CEOs’ appointees, AppointPrevCEO. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if an executive on the top-four list in year t is not on the list in year t+1. Columns 
(1) and (2) utilize the full executive panel data, while Columns (3) and (4) include only executives 
whose tenure on the list of top-four non-CEO executives are above the sample median, EXETEN > 
Median. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, excluding 2002. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
the Appendix. All regressions are estimated by the firm level conditional logistic regressions and control 
for year dummies. Because the propensity score is matched at the firm level, not at the executive level, 
our estimation is based only on the unmatched sample. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses 
are clustered at the firm level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
 
 
Exe_Turnover 
 
AppointCurCEO AppointPrevCEO 
AppointCurCEO  
EXETEN > 
Median 
AppointPrevCEO  
EXETEN > Median 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Affected*Post -0.009 0.249** -0.008 0.363*** 
 
(0.132) (0.111) (0.281) (0.124) 
EXETEN -0.012** 0.027*** -0.001 0.032*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
EXE_OWN 1.521 -1.798 -0.185 -1.413 
 
(1.070) (1.185) (0.973) (1.178) 
Return -0.150*** -0.087*** -0.273*** -0.109*** 
 
(0.049) (0.025) (0.096) (0.037) 
Ln(TotalAsset) 0.140** 0.160*** 0.085 0.096 
 
(0.063) (0.059) (0.162) (0.074) 
CEO_Founder 0.552*** 0.556*** 0.317 0.365** 
 
(0.194) (0.126) (0.440) (0.170) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 15,100 19,816 4,590 14,258 
Prob> Chi2 0 0 0 0 
Wald 58.99 152.5 40.53 127.0 
pseudo-R2 0.00509 0.00977 0.0120 0.0125 
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Table A-3: CEO Turnovers and the Independent Board Requirement. 
 
This table estimates the impact of the independent board requirement on CEO turnovers. The 
dependent variable is an indicator for CEO turnover, equal to one if a CEO in year t is not 
the same as the CEO in year t-1. Control variables include Return, one year buy-and-hold 
stock returns because CEO turnovers are likely to be related to firm performance. We also 
control for indicators for CEO-Chair and CEO-founder because they may affect CEOs’ 
ability to remain in the job. Other control variables include firm size, and CEOs’ tenure and 
share ownership. (In unreported regressions, we include a triple interaction, 
Affected*Post*Returnt-1, to control for possible changes in turnover-performance sensitivity 
for CEOs. The coefficients on the triple interaction term are significantly negative, indicating 
newly independent boards increase CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. More important, 
the coefficient on Affected*Post remains insignificant.) All control variables are lagged by 
one year. Columns (1) and (2) report estimation results with the unmatched and propensity-
score (PS) matched sample, respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, excluding 2002. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Regressions are estimated by the 
firm level conditional logit model with year dummies. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
CEO_Turnover 
 
Unmatched PS-matched 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Affected*Post 0.495 0.377 
 
(0.327) (0.332) 
Returnt-1 -0.307*** -0.363** 
 
(0.100) (0.179) 
Ln(TotalAsset)t-1 -0.003 -0.059 
 
(0.136) (0.219) 
Foundert-1 -1.638*** -1.176* 
 
(0.632) (0.644) 
CEOTENt-1 0.296*** 0.226*** 
 
(0.031) (0.040) 
CEO_OWNt-1 -2.568 -5.253* 
 
(2.517) (2.988) 
CEO_Chairt-1 -0.119 0.214 
 
(0.235) (0.391) 
Year Dummies Y Y 
Observations 5,203 2,102 
Prob> Chi2 0 0 
Wald 177.3 75.40 
pseudo-R2 0.190 0.166 
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Table A-4: Confounding Effects. 
 
This table reestimates the regulatory effects using a series of year indicator variables for pre- and 
post-regulation periods to test for confounding effects of pre-regulation events on the fraction of 
top-four non-CEO executives appointed during a current CEO’s tenure (FT4A). Dummy variables 
2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005 and after are equal to one if the observation is in 2000, 2001, 
2003, 2004, and 2005-2006, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) results estimated with the 
unmatched and the propensity-score (PS) sample. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, excluding 
2002. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. The regressions control for year- and 
firm fixed effects and include the same control variables as in Table 3 but are not reported. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 FT4A 
 Unmatched PS-Matched   (1) (2) 
Affected*2000  -0.000 -0.008 
 (0.022) (0.020) Affected*2001  0.024 0.012 
 (0.024) (0.021) Affected*2003  0.066** 0.021 
 (0.026) (0.021) Affected*2004  0.088*** 0.036* 
 (0.029) (0.020) Affected*2005andafter  0.113*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.030) (0.020) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y 
Observations 6,304 2,695 
Adjusted R2 0.701 0.742 
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Panel B: Alternative Definitions of FT4A.  
 
Unmatched PS-Matched 
 
WFT4A AFT4A WAFT4A WFT4A AFT4A WAFT4A 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Affected*Post 0.081*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.029** 0.044*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y N N Y N N 
Observations 6,304 6,304 6,304 2,695 2,695 2,695 
Adjusted R2 0.702 0.512 0.521 0.741 0.555 0.559 
 
 
 
Table A-5: Other Robustness Checks. 
 
Panel A estimates how the degree to which a firm is affected by the independent board requirement is 
related to changes in the fraction of top-four non-CEO executives appointed (FT4A) during a CEO’s 
tenure. The key independent variable is Pct_Dep_Dir*Post, the percentage of non-independent directors 
in 2001 interacted with the post-regulation indicator. The regression does not include Pct_Dep_Dir and 
Post as separate controls because of firm- and year fixed effects.  
 
Panel B reestimates the OLS regressions in Table 3 with three alternative measures of FT4A. WFT4A 
is FT4A weighted by the sum of executives’ salaries and bonuses; AFT4A, an abnormal measure of 
FT4A; and WAFT4A, an abnormal measure of WFT4A. Columns (1)-(3) and Columns (4)-(6) report 
results estimated with the unmatched sample and the propensity-score (PS) matched sample, 
respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 2006, excluding 2002. Coefficients marked with *, **, and 
*** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Heterogeneity in the Treatment Effects. 
 
FT4A 
 
Unmatched PS-Matched 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Pct_Dep_Dir*Post 0.243*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.052) (0.039) 
   Observations 6,304 2,695 
Adjusted R2 0.703 0.743 
